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INTRODUCTION
Did the Washington Supreme Court make the right decision
when it recently held that intentional wrongdoers, who are assessed a
penalty of punitive damages, may shirk their responsibility by passing
the cost of those damages on to the insurance-buying public via its in-
surers? This issue was of such significance that amicus curiae briefs
were submitted by several large insurance companies and Washington
corporations, including American International Companies (AIG),
American Insurers, State Farm, Lloyd's of London, Costco Wholesale
Corporation, Puget Sound Energy, Weyerhaeuser, as well as the
Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation. After ex-
amining the moral and pragmatic ramifications of this decision, one
must conclude that the court erred.
Consider the following scenario: a Washington company, Fluke,
desires to put its California competitor, Talon, out of business. Fluke
devises a plan to sue Talon for patent infringement. Unfortunately for
Fluke, the case goes to trial, and the jury finds that Fluke had no basis
for bringing the suit and that Fluke's ulterior motive was to remove its
competitor from the marketplace.
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Taking great exception to being wrongfully sued, Talon retaliates
by initiating a lawsuit against Fluke in California State court, alleging
that Fluke maliciously prosecuted the patent infringement claim in an
attempt to force Talon out of business. Fluke tenders the claim to its
liability insurer, which notifies Fluke that California law does not al-
low insurance coverage for punitive damages. Fearing a lack of cover-
age, Fluke initiates a declaratory action against its insurance company
in Washington.
In the meantime, a California jury finds in favor of Talon and
awards two million dollars in compensatory damages and four million
dollars in punitive damages. Both Fluke and Talon then move for
summary judgment in the declaratory action.
Applying Washington law, the Superior Court construes the in-
surance policy's insuring clause as providing coverage for compensa-
tory damages but not for punitive damages. Fluke appeals, and the
Washington Court of Appeals agrees with the Superior Court that
Washington law applies to this action, upholding the ruling on com-
pensatory damages. However, and more importantly, the appellate
court disagrees with the trial court on the issue of punitive damages,
finding that it is not against public policy to insure punitive damages
in Washington.
Of course, this narrative is too fact-specific to be a hypothetical.
Indeed, the precise scenario described above actually unfolded in
Washington recently in Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company.1 Hartford filed a petition for review with the Washington
Supreme Court, which was granted.2 The Washington Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on September 11, 2001, and on November
21, 2001, it affirmed the Court of Appeals on all issues.' As a result,
punitive damages are now considered to be insurable in Washington
State.
This Note examines the issue of the insurability of punitive dam-
ages, concluding that insurance coverage should not be allowed for
punitive damages arising from intentional misconduct because such
coverage contravenes public policy in the state of Washington. Part I
defines and provides background for punitive damages and malicious
prosecution. Part II outlines and synthesizes the treatment of the in-
surability of punitive damages in various states. The facts of the Fluke
case, including the Court of Appeals's rationale that insurance cover-
1. 102 Wash. App. 237, 7 P.3d 825 (2000).
2. Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026, 22 P.3d 802
(2001).
3. Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 145 Wash. 2d 137, 34 P.3d 809(2001).
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age for punitive damages is not against public policy in Washington,
are detailed in Part III. The next section reveals the Court of Ap-
peals's faulty reasoning, illuminating several reasons why Washington
should prohibit insurance coverage for punitive damages arising out of
intentional misconduct. Part V summarizes the Washington Supreme
Court's decision affirming the appellate court on the issue of whether
insuring punitive damages is against public policy in Washington.
This Note concludes in Part VI that punitive damages assessed for in-
tentional misconduct should not be insurable in Washington as a mat-
ter of public policy and that the Washington Supreme Court should
have reversed the appellate court on this issue.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
A. Punitive Damages
When suing in tort, plaintiffs may be awarded punitive damages
in addition to and apart from compensatory damages.4 Punitive dam-
ages (also called exemplary damages, punitory damages, or vindictive
damages5) are awarded not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish
and deter defendants (and potentially others) from such conduct in the
future.' "Punitive damages 'are not compensation for injury. Instead,
they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence.""
Punitive damages have existed in America since the late 1700s
and have "received widespread and substantial acceptance."8 To illus-
trate this longstanding principle one need look no further than Day v.
Woodworth,9 in which the United States Supreme Court stated the fol-
lowing:
[i]t is a well-established principle of the common law, that in ac-
tions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may
inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive dam-
ages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his of-
fence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.
4. 1 DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL LIABILITY RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 44 (2d ed. 1986).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (7th ed. 1999).
6. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash. 2d 640, 662, 935 P.2d 555, 566-67 (1997).
7. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
8. Jill McKee Pohlman, Comment, Punitive Damages in the American Civil Justice System:
Jackpot or Justice?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 613, 619 (1996).
9. 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
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We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been ques-
tioned by some writers; but if repeated judicial decisions for
more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of
what the law is, the question will not admit of argument) °
Washington is one of only five states that disallows juries from
awarding punitive damages in the first place because they are contrary
to public policy.1' It is important to note, however, that punitive dam-
ages may be awarded in Washington when assessed under the law of
another state, under federal law, 12 or where expressly authorized by
statute. 13 For example, punitive damages are expressly authorized un-
der California law where Talon sued Fluke for malicious prosecu-
tion. 14 Importantly, Fluke is the first case in which the insurability of
punitive damages has been addressed in Washington." Prior to Fluke,
Washington was one of seven states that was undecided on the issue.'6
B. Malicious Prosecution
Fluke was sued for malicious prosecution in the instant case.1
7
Malicious prosecution at common law involved the institution of a
criminal or civil proceeding for an improper purpose and without
probable cause. 8 Once a wrongful prosecution has ended in the de-
fendant's favor, he or she may sue for tort damages. 9 To establish a
cause of action for malicious prosecution in California, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the di-
rection of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in
plaintiff's favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was
initiated with malice.2" Although malicious prosecution originated as
10. Id.
11. McKee Pohlman, supra note 8, at 620. The other states are Louisiana (Int'l Harvester
Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988)); Massachusetts (Pine v. Rust, 535
N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Mass. 1989)); Nebraska (Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 777
(Neb. 1991)); and New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.16 (2002)). For Washington,
see, e.g., Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 572, 574, 919 P.2d 589, 590 (1996).
12. Kammerer v. W. Gear Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 422-23, 635 P.2d 708, 711-12 (1981).
13. Winchester v. Stein, 135 Wash. 2d 835, 858, 959 P.2d 1077, 1088 (1998).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 2002). "In an action for the breach of an obligation
not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
15. See Lorelie S. Masters, Punitive Damages: Covered or Not?, 55 BUS. LAW. 283, 299
(1999) (emphasis added).
16. Seeid. at 23.
17. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 241, 7 P.3d at 827.
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 970 (7th ed. 1999).
19. Id.
20. Brennan v. Tremco Inc., 20 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Cal. 2001).
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a remedy for individuals subjected to maliciously instituted criminal
charges, the tort has been extended in most common law jurisdictions
to afford a remedy for the malicious prosecution of civil actions as
well. 1
Absent a specific exclusion, most commercial general liability
policies provide coverage for malicious prosecution under the "Per-
sonal Injury" portion of said policies.22 Additionally, most commer-
cial general liability policies are construed to provide coverage for pu-
nitive damages.23 Nevertheless, it is well settled that agreements or
contracts against public policy are illegal and void.24 "[F]reedom of
contract is subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be
against public policy."2  From these facts, the debate ensues: even
though an insurance policy might be construed to provide coverage for
punitive damages arising from malicious prosecution or other inten-
tional torts, should public policy concerns override the insurance pol-
icy and preclude coverage?
The Washington Supreme Court has now weighed in on this is-
sue; however, a tension remains. This tension arises from the conflict
between parties' freedom of contract on one hand versus a public pol-
icy judgment on the other hand that parties should not be allowed to
insure against intentional wrongdoing.
II. TREATMENT OF THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
OTHER STATES
An analysis of other states' treatment of the insurability of puni-
tive damages helps put the issue in perspective. According to authori-
tative reports, twenty-seven states (including Washington) permit 1i-
21. Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. 1989).
22. 1 MALECKI ET AL., supra note 4, at 296. Fluke's policy explicitly provided malicious
prosecution coverage. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 241, 7 P.3d at 827 ("The policy defines 'per-
sonal injury' as 'injury, other than 'bodily injury,' arising out of one or more of the following of-
fenses: ... b. Malicious prosecution."')
23. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d I (Tenn. 1964);
Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522 (Ariz. 1972); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1973); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013
(Or. 1977); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1979); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Am.
Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va.
1981); Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1983); Provi-
dence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 684 P.2d 861 (Alaska 1984); Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677
(Wis. 1985); United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Webb, 369 S.E.2d 196 (Va. 1988); South Carolina
State Budget & Control Bd. v. Prince, 403 S.E.2d 643 (S.C. 1991).
24. E.g., 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 257 (1991).
25. Id.
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ability insurance coverage for punitive damages as a matter of public
policy, eighteen states disallow such coverage, and six states are unde-
cided.26 However, of the twenty-seven states that permit coverage for
punitive damages, nearly thirty percent of them make an exception for
punitive damages assessed for intentional misconduct.27
Additionally, more than half of the eighteen states that prohibit
coverage for punitive damages make an exception for punitive dam-
ages assessed as a result of vicarious liability.2" The Appendix of this
Note provides a synopsis of the various states' positions as compiled
from the secondary sources noted above. From these statistics, it is
clear that while a majority of the states permit coverage for punitive
damages, an overwhelming number of them have recognized that cov-
erage is not appropriate where the insured has engaged in intentional
wrongdoing. Moreover, states forbidding punitive damages insurance
coverage have noted that punitive and deterrent goals of punitive
damages are not served when damages are assessed for the conduct of
another under vicarious liability, such as under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior."
Based on the various states' treatment as a whole, a debate about
the merits of punitive damages coverage would be incomplete without
distinguishing between intentional and unintentional conduct. These
contentions are discussed in Part IV.
III. THE FACTS OF THE FLUKE CASE AND THE WASHINGTON
COURT OF APPEALS'S HOLDINGS
When the Washington Supreme Court rendered its opinion in
November of 2001, it dedicated only one short paragraph to the issue
of whether "Washington public policy forbids shielding the insured
from the burden of punitive damages."3 Because the Court shed little
light on its reasoning for concluding that punitive damages are insur-
able in Washington, it is more informative to examine the Court of
Appeals's opinion.
26. See Masters, supra note 15, at 283; Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Liability In-
surance Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R.4th 11
(1982).
27. See Masters, supra note 15, at 283; Rosenhouse, supra note 26, at 11.
28. See Masters, supra note 15, at 283; Rosenhouse, supra note 26, at 11.
29. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968) (permitting in-
surer to pay amount of judgment representing punitive damages on account of assault by in-
sured employer's employee).
30. Fluke, 145 Wash. 2d at 148, 34 P.3d at 813.
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A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1988, Fluke Corporation, a manufacturer of electrical equip-
ment based in Everett, Washington, brought a patent infringement
suit against a California competitor, Talon Instruments, and Talon's
president, Robert Corby." Fluke lost.32 Judgment was entered in De-
cember 1992 on the jury's verdict of non-infringement. 3
Talon and Corby sued Fluke in California state court in Novem-
ber of 1993, alleging that Fluke maliciously prosecuted the patent in-
fringement claim in an attempt to force them out of business.34 Fluke
tendered the claim to its commercial general liability and umbrella in-
surer, Hartford.3"
Hartford agreed to defend Fluke in the lawsuit but notified Fluke
that California law does not allow insurance coverage for intentional
acts, including malicious prosecution, or for punitive damages.36 In
response to this news, Fluke instituted suit against Hartford in a
Washington court in July 1996, seeking a declaration of coverage.37
The parties agreed to stay the litigation in Washington until the entry
of a final judgment in the California malicious prosecution case.38
The California jury found in favor of Talon and Corby in the
spring of 1997. 3' The jury's verdict awarded two million dollars in
compensatory damages and four million in punitive damages.4" Both
Fluke and Hartford then moved for summary judgment in the de-
41claratory action.
31. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 241, 7 P.3d at 827.







39. Id. at 241, 7 P.3d at 828.
40. Id. at 241-42, 7 P.3d at 828. On the issue of punitive damages, the jury was instructed
as follows:
If you find the plaintiff suffered actual injury, harm or loss caused by malicious prose-
cution, you must decide in addition whether by clear and convincing evidence you find
that there was malice in the conduct on which you base your finding of liability. Mal-
ice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard for the rights [sic] of others. Despicable conduct is conduct so vile, base,
contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and
depicted by ordinary, decent people.
Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Int'l Companies at 3, Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026, 22 P.3d 802 (2001) (No. 70519-4) (emphasis added).
41. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 242, 7 P.3d at 828.
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Choosing to apply Washington law, the Snohomish County Su-
perior Court found no bar to Fluke's entitlement to coverage for the
award of compensatory damages.42 As to punitive damages, however,
the court construed the policy's insuring clause as providing no cover-
age.43 The court awarded Fluke its fees and costs under the rule of
Olympic Steamship.44 Fluke appealed the ruling denying coverage for
punitive damages, and Hartford appealed the ruling granting coverage
for compensatory damages. The case went before the Court of Ap-
peals of Washington, Division 1.4 The Court of Appeals held that (1)
Hartford unequivocally agreed in the insurance contract to cover both
compensatory and punitive damages;46 and (2) coverage for compensa-
tory or punitive damages arising from malicious prosecution are not
against public policy in Washington.47
B. The Court of Appeals's Holdings
The Court of Appeals held that (1) Hartford agreed to cover
both compensatory and punitive damages in Fluke's insurance poli-
cies; (2) there is no statutory prohibition of insuring punitive damages
in Washington, and absent a statute, Washington courts are reluctant
to invoke public policy as a reason to limit or avoid express contract
terms; (3) Washington does not have a policy of imposing punitive
damages to punish and deter wrongdoing; Washington's only express
policy is that they are disfavored; and (4) Hartford collected a pre-
mium for the coverage, and therefore the insured had a legitimate and
enforceable expectation of receiving the coverage promised.
While the Court of Appeals did not devote a large portion of its
opinion to the issue of whether punitive damages should be insurable
in Washington, its analysis was more thorough than that of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court. First, the Court of Appeals examined Fluke's
policies and concluded that they provided coverage for both compen-
satory and punitive damages.4" Under Coverage B of the primary
42. Id. at 242, 7 P.3d at 828.
43. Id.
44. Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 117 Wash. 2d 37, 53, 811 P.2d 673
(1991) (holding that an insured is entitled to recover its attorney fees when it is compelled to as-
sume the burden of legal action to obtain the benefit of its insurance policy).
45. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 242, 7 P.3d at 828.
46. Id. at 244-45, 7 P.3d at 829.
47. Id. at 248, 7 P.3d at 831. In addition, the court considered these other issues, which are
beyond the scope of this article: (1) whether the Hartford policy provided punitive damages cov-
erage (yes); (2) whether indemnification for malicious prosecution is against public policy in
Washington (no); (3) choice of law between Washington and California (Washington); and (4)
whether Fluke was entitled to attorney fees under Olympic Steamship (yes).
48. Id. at 242-45, 7 P.3d at 828-29.
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commercial general liability policy, "Personal and Advertising Injury
Liability," Hartford agreed to pay "those sums that the insured be-
comes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'personal injury'
or 'advertising injury' to which this insurance applies."49 The policy
defined "personal injury" as "injury, other than 'bodily injury,' arising
out of one or more of the following offenses: ... b. Malicious
prosecution."" ° The primary policy granted a limit of one million
dollars for each occurrence."s The umbrella policy granted similar
coverage with a limit of nine million dollars.5 2 The policies contained
thirty-four subsections of exclusions, including an exclusion for the
"violation of a penal statute." 3 There was no exclusion for punitive
damages. "
Next, the appellate court dissected (and ultimately rejected) the
Snohomish County Superior Court's analysis of the policy language.
The Superior Court had found that the language of the policies, cover-
ing damages that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay "be-
cause of' personal injury, did not cover punitive damages.55 The Su-
perior Court reasoned that punitive damages were awarded not to
compensate but rather to deter and punish, without regard to the ex-
tent to which the wronged party was damaged, and therefore they are
not damages flowing from ("because of') the tort of malicious prose-
cution. 6 Hence, they were not included under coverage for damages
the insured must pay "because of' the injury arising out of the in-
sured's misconduct.
5 7
After reviewing case law from other jurisdictions, the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the Superior court, finding the court's ration-
ale to be the minority rule.58 The Court of Appeals then provided a
clear statement of the majority rule regarding insurability of punitive
damages: "Most courts do not focus on the meaning of 'because of;
they look instead to the phrase 'all sums that the insured becomes le-
gally obligated to pay as damages' and interpret it as providing cover-
age for punitive damages."5 9 Courts embracing this majority rule have
emphasized the absence of a specific exclusion for punitive damages,




53. Id. at 242-43, 7 P.3d at 828.
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noting the absence of any other distinction in the policy between com-
pensatory and punitive damages.6" Citing to the Oregon Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals said that "a person insured by such a pol-
icy would suppose that the term 'damages' would include all damage
which became, by judgment, a 'sum' that the insured became legally
obligated to pay - including punitive damages. " 61 In short, the Court
of Appeals found the majority rule to be in accord with the interpre-
tive rules followed by Washington courts in construing insurance
policies.62 Thus, if Hartford wished to exclude punitive damages, it
could have inserted the word "compensatory" or added a specific pu-
nitive damages exclusion.63 "We will not add language to the policy
that the insurer did not include. 64
Second, the court pointed out that Washington's statutes do not
make punitive damages uninsurable; absent a statute, Washington
courts are reluctant to invoke public policy as a reason to limit or avoid
express contractual terms.s One explanation for the reluctance is that
among the branches of government, the judiciary is the least capable
of receiving public input and resolving broad policy questions.66
Therefore, Washington courts have relied on policy to strike down in-
surance provisions only when that policy "pervades our entire scheme
of insurance legislation."6' A second reason that the courts are unre-
ceptive to arguments made by insurance companies that coverage is
void as against public policy is because the insurers draft the policy
language and cannot argue that their own drafting is unfair.68
Third, the court noted that Washington does not have a policy of
imposing punitive damages to punish and deter wrongdoing; rather,
Washington's only express policy is that they are disfavored. 69 "Our
courts view [punitive damages] as 'a penalty generally reserved for
criminal sanctions,' inappropriate in civil cases because they give the
60. Id. at 243, 7 P.3d at 829.
61. Id. at 244, 7 P.3d at 829 (citing Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1015
(Or. 1977)).
62. "Insurance contracts should be interpreted in the way that an average insured would
read them." Id. (citing Bowers v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 99 Wash. App. 41, 45, 991 P.2d 734, 737
(2000)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 134 Wash. 2d
413, 430, 951 P.2d 250, 257 (1998)).
65. Id. at 246, 7 P.3d at 830 (citing State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d
477, 481, 687 P.2d 1139, 1142 (1984)).
66. Id. (citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wash. 2d 381, 385, 755 P.2d 759, 761 (1988)).
67. Id. (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash. 2d 203, 208, 643 P.2d
441, 444 (1982)).
68. Id. (quoting Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d at 430, 951 P.2d at 257.
69. Id. at 248, 7 P.3d at 831.
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plaintiff a windfall beyond full compensation."7" The court refused to
assume that being covered for punitive damages encourages insureds
to commit egregious wrongs.71 The decision on the question of
whether punitive damages should be insurable is best left to the
Washington Legislature."
Finally, the court stated that Fluke's policy promised coverage
for those sums Fluke became obligated to pay either as compensatory
or punitive damages arising from malicious prosecution.73 "Hartford
collected a premium for that coverage. " 74 "An insured who has paid a
premium ordinarily has a legitimate and enforceable expectation of re-
ceiving the coverage promised." 7' Therefore, the insured could expect
coverage for punitive damages arising out of malicious prosecution.
In its decision, the Washington Court of Appeals failed to ad-
dress many valid arguments opposing insurance coverage for punitive
damages. It concluded that Fluke's policy explicitly covered punitive
damages; that there is no public policy against insuring punitive dam-
ages in Washington; that Washington's only express public policy re-
garding punitive damages is that they are disfavored; and that Fluke
paid for punitive damages coverage and therefore had a legitimate ex-
pectation of coverage. From these arguments, the Court of Appeals
concluded that insurance for punitive damages necessarily does not of-
fend Washington public policy. The next section analyzes the Court
of Appeals's rationale and reveals flaws in its logic.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS'S DEFECTIVE
REASONING
The Court of Appeals erred in deciding that insurance for puni-
tive damages is not against public policy in Washington. This hold-
ing is incorrect for the following reasons: (1) although there is no
Washington statute prohibiting insurance coverage of punitive dam-
ages in Washington, there is no statute permitting it, either, and pub-
lic policy ultimately disfavors such coverage; (2) while punitive dam-
ages are generally disfavored in Washington, public policy does not
necessarily favor insurance coverage for such damages; (3) allowing
policyholders to insure their intentional wrongdoing encourages bad






75. Id. (citing Thiringer v. Am. Motors Ins. Co., 91 Wash. 2d 215, 220, 588 P.2d 191, 194
(1978)).
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behavior; (4) there is no evidence that Fluke and Hartford expressly
contemplated whether punitive damages were covered by the insur-
ance contracts; (5) allowing punitive damages to be insured thwarts
the dual purpose of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence;
(6) insuring punitive damages allows wrongdoers to unfairly pass their
costs onto the premium-paying public; and (7) the court should have
distinguished between allowing coverage for punitive damages arising
out of unintentional conduct versus intentional conduct. Each of these
contentions will be successively examined below.
A. The Lack of a Washington Statute Prohibiting Punitive Damages
Coverage Is Not Dispositive
The court emphasized that Washington statutes do not prohibit
the insuring of punitive damages, and absent such a statute, Washing-
ton courts are reluctant to invoke public policy to invalidate express
contract terms. 6  Nevertheless, it is inconsequential that the
Washington Legislature has failed to enact a statute prohibiting the
insurability of punitive damages because Washington law generally
does not permit punitive damages in the first place.77 Accordingly, it
would be illogical for the Legislature to prohibit the insuring of
punitive damages when Washington courts, applying Washington
law, are not allowed to assess them in the first place.
Although it is appropriate to look toward the Legislature for a
pronouncement of public policy, it is imperative to remember that this
branch of government is not the only source from which such policy
can be discerned. For example, the Washington Supreme Court has
recognized at least three sources of public policy: statutes, judicial de-
cisions, and public morals. 7' Although courts have been hesitant to
use public policy to invalidate insurance contract provisions,79 when
the Legislature has not enacted a statute, Washington courts refer to
76. Id. at 246, 7 P.3d at 830.
77. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Amici Curiae Alliance of Am. In-
surers & State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. at 4-5, Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026, 22 P.3d 802 (2001) (No. 70519-4).
78. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Amicus Curiae American Interna-
tional Companies at 4, Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026, 22
P.3d 802 (2001) (No. 70519-4) (stating "In general, a contract which is not prohibited by statute,
condemned by judicial decision, or contrary to the public morals, contravenes no principle of
public policy.") (quoting State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 481, 687
P.2d 1139, 1142 (1984)). See also Cary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Wash. 2d 335, 346-47, 922 P.2d
1335, 1341 (1996); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cohen, 124 Wash. 2d 865, 873-74, 881 P.2d
1001, 1006 (1994); Schab v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App. 418, 422-23, 704
P.2d 621, 624 (1985)).
79. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d at 483, 687 P.2d at 1139.
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their own pronouncements of law and policy, or to the "public mor-
als."80 As to sources of public policy, the Washington Supreme Court
has said:
The term "public policy," ... embraces all acts or contracts
which tend clearly to injure the public health, the public morals,
the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the
law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights,
whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any
citizen ought to feel.81
The Washington Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have
found that public policy prohibits insurance coverage for intentional
misconduct: "It is against public policy to insure against liability aris-
ing from the intentional infliction of injury on the person of an-
other."82 Indeed, the court has utilized public policy to prohibit the
assessment of punitive damages in this state.8" Therefore, if the courts
hold that it is against public policy to insure against intentional injury
and to assess punitive damages, it follows a fortiori that it is against
public policy to insure against punitive damages flowing from inten-
tional misconduct.
Dissenters would argue that the doctrine of "freedom of con-
tract"84 should govern in situations like this one. Assuming arguendo
that Fluke and Hartford expressly bargained for punitive damages
coverage, then Fluke should receive coverage. However, it is well es-
tablished that the "freedom of contract" doctrine is tempered with the
caveat that contracting parties may not enter into contracts if the sub-
80. Brief of Amicus Curiae American International Companies at 5, Fluke Corp. v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026 (2001) (No. 70519-4).
81. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d at 483, 687 P.2d at 1139 (quoting LaPoint v. Richards, 66
Wash. 2d 585, 594-95, 403 P.2d 889, 895 (1965)).
82. Cohen, 124 Wash. 2d at 871, 881 P.2d at 1005. See also Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau,
113 Wash. 2d 91, 98, 776 P.2d 123, 126 (1989) (stating that "public policy or law actually pro-
hibits the purchase of insurance covering [wrongful acts (intentional torts)]"); Detweiler v. J.C.
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 110 Wash. 2d 99, 106, 751 P.2d 282, 285 (1988); Federated Am. Ins. Co.
v. Strong, 102 Wash. 2d 665, 674-75, 689 P.2d 68, 74 (1984); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spokane
Sch. Dist. No. 81, 20 Wash. App. 261, 265, 579 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1978) (stating that "public
policy prevents an insured from benefiting from his wrongful acts").
83. Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 572, 574, 919 P.2d 589, 590 (1996).
84. "Every person has the inherent and inalienable right to freely deal or refuse to deal with
his fellow men, and the right to make and enforce contracts is one of the most valuable and sa-
cred rights of individuals and corporations. Competent persons ordinarily have the utmost lib-
erty of contracting, and their agreements voluntarily and fairly made will be held valid and en-
forced in the courts. Parties may incorporate in their agreements any provisions that are not
illegal or violative of public policy." 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 238 (1991) (emphasis added).
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ject matter is against public policy."5 Applying the facts of this case to
the Emerson" quote above, allowing Fluke to reap the benefit of its al-
leged "bargain" injures the public morals and the public confidence in
the purity of the administration of the law and violates Washington
public policy. During a time when the Enron, Arthur Anderson, and
WorldCom fiascos loom large, many citizens likely believe that per-
sons or entities can buy their way out of any kind of wrongdoing. As a
result, citizens' confidence in our justice system has diminished. The
Fluke court incorrectly disregarded the negative effect punitive dam-
ages coverage could have on public morals and confidence.
B. The Prohibition of Punitive Damages in Washington Does Not
Necessarily Imply that Public Policy Must Favor the linsurability of
Punitive Damages
As noted previously, Washington law disfavors punitive dam-
ages awards because they are against public policy.8 7 Yet, the Fluke
court inexplicably concluded that Washington public policy must fa-
vor insurance coverage for punitive damages."8 It would make better
sense to hold that if the state does not allow punitive damages because
they create a windfall for the plaintiff, then the state should not allow
wrongdoers to obtain insurance coverage that would guarantee a plain-
tiff a source of funds for the windfall. The Fluke court did the oppo-
site. The decision essentially allows policyholders to purchase insur-
ance protecting them from the very punitive damages that the courts
in this state have found to be against public policy. Because punitive
damages are against public policy in Washington, the court should
have decided that insuring them is also against public policy.
C. Allowing Policyholders to Insure Their Intentional Wrongdoing
Encourages Bad Behavior
In one brief sentence, the Fluke court assumed that punitive
damages coverage would not encourage insureds to commit egregious
wrongs.8 9 However, one might argue that allowing policyholders to
insure against punishment for their intentional wrongdoing will have
the negative effect of encouraging misconduct because wrongdoers will
85. E.g., id. ("An agreement or contract made in violation of established public policy is
not binding and will not be enforced. Thus, freedom of contract is subject to the limitation that
the agreement must not be against public policy.").
86. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d at 483, 687 P.2d at 1143.
87. Dailey, 129 Wash. 2d at 574, 919 P.2d at 590.
88. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 248, 7 P.3d at 831.
89. Id. at 248, 7 P.3d at 831.
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no longer be held directly accountable for their actions. After Fluke, if
a Washington insured desires to commit an intentional wrong, carry-
ing with it the potential of punitive damages, the insured can simply
purchase insurance coverage covering it. Essentially, Fluke allows an
insured to conduct a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether
wrongdoing might be worthwhile.90 If this balancing test shows that
the benefits of insurance outweigh the costs of committing an inten-
tional wrong, an insured is more likely to engage in that wrongdoing.91
Thus, the Washington courts should not encourage contemptible be-
havior by allowing policyholders to bankroll such transgressions.
D. Fluke and Hartford Did Not Necessarily Contemplate Whether
Punitive Damages Were Covered
The Washington Court of Appeals assumed without question
that "Hartford collected a premium for that [punitive damages] cover-
age."92 "Ordinarily, an insured who has paid a premium has a legiti-
mate and enforceable expectation of receiving the coverage."93 How-
ever, from the record, it is unclear whether Fluke or Hartford ever
contemplated that punitive damages would be covered in Washington
or whether Hartford charged an additional premium for the cover-
age.94 In fact, even though the Court of Appeals said that the Hart-
ford policy "promised coverage for those sums Fluke became obli-
gated to pay either as compensatory or punitive damages arising from
malicious prosecution,"9" it was not clear at the outset that the policy
plainly covered punitive damages. This fact is borne out by the
court's devotion of a fair amount of its opinion to determining whether
Fluke's insurance contract even covered punitive damages in the first
place.96
Because the court had to conduct an extensive analysis to deter-
mine whether punitive damages were covered by Fluke's policy, it is
90. See Gary S. Franklin, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart out
of "Smart Money," 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 1018 (1986).
91. Id.
92. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 248, 7 P.3d at 831.
93. Id. at 248, 7 P.3d at 831.
94. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Amicus Curiae Certain Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd's, London and Certain London Market Companies at 5, Fluke Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026, 22 P.3d 802 (2001) (No. 70519-4).
95. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 248, 7 P.3d at 381.
96. Id. at 242-45, 7 P.3d at 828-30. Under Coverage B of Fluke's primary commercial
general liability policy, "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability," Hartford agreed to pay
"those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'personal
injury' or 'advertising injury' to which this insurance applies." Id. (emphasis added). The policy
did not explicitly mention that it covered punitive damages.
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untenable to conclude that Fluke and Hartford expressly agreed that
punitive damages were covered by the policy. Coupling this fact with
the uncertain status of the insurability of punitive damages in Wash-
ington before Fluke (at the time the policy in question was negotiated),
the Court of Appeals's argument is even less convincing.
E. Punishment and Deterrence
By allowing Fluke to tender its punitive damages judgment to its
insurer, the court ignored the main purposes of awarding punitive
damages: punishment and deterrence.17 California has adopted these
reasons as the rationale behind its policy favoring punitive damages.98
"[T]he purposes of punitive damages, in... California ... , are to
punish the defendant and to deter future misconduct by making an
example of the defendant."99 Consequently, allowing an insured to
commit an intentional act of harm toward another while simultane-
ously placing responsibility of payment on the insurer serves neither
purpose. The insured escapes punishment because it is free from pay-
ing any of the judgment. Further, the insured will not be deterred
from engaging in misconduct in the future because it is aware that any
intentional misconduct will be bankrolled by its insurer.
Some might argue that a wrongdoer such as Fluke would suffer
punishment in the form of a policy cancellation or higher premiums
after a punitive damage loss. This argument is flawed. The threat of
policy cancellations do not dissuade a policyholder from engaging in
intentional wrongdoing, because if cancellation occurs, it takes place
after the wrongdoing has occurred. Stated differently, the policy-
holder will still receive punitive damages coverage for that first act of
wrongdoing. Furthermore, allowing insureds to pass punitive dam-
ages awards on to their insurers will not deter others from engaging in
similar conduct. Indeed, seeing tortfeasors go unpunished will give
others implied license to engage in similar misconduct. Potential
wrongdoers would simply purchase an insurance policy covering puni-
tive damages before engaging in the wrongful conduct. This scenario
is analogous to a criminal purchasing a "get out of jail free" pass be-
fore committing a crime. Surely the Court of Appeals could have in-
voked public policy to override this sort of criminal "insurance" had it
existed; certainly it should rule accordingly in civil suits involving in-
tentional misconduct. The courts erred in not considering these fac-
tors.
97. Sintra, 131 Wash. 2d at 662, 935 P.2d at 566.
98. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 656-59 (Cal. 1999).
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 2002).
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In this case, Fluke was rewarded for its successful forum shop-
ping. in bringing the declaratory action against Hartford in Wash-
ington, where the insurability of punitive damages issue had not yet
been decided.' Had Fluke brought suit in California, the outcome
would have been much different; the California court would have ap-
plied its statute prohibiting the insuring of punitive damages to find
against Fluke. Hence, the Washington Supreme Court added insult to
injury by allowing Fluke to "work the system" to circumvent Califor-
nia's laws. In essence, Fluke was allowed to exploit the California ju-
dicial system to attempt to put a California company out of business,
but when California law ceased to suit its needs, Fluke methodically
rejected the California courts and successfully obtained a forum in
Washington.
F. Allowing Intentional Wrongdoers to Insure Punitive Damages Imposes
the Cost of Wrongdoing onto the Premium-Paying Public
The insurance mechanism involves collecting and pooling pre-
miums from all eligible insureds so that those who suffer covered
losses receive indemnity. As losses become more frequent and severe,
insurance companies must increase everyone's premiums in order to
fulfill future loss-paying obligations. Additional costs will arise not
only in the payment of higher judgments, but also in the areas of
added administrative and legal expenses, extra reserving costs, loss of
policyholder confidence, and the cost of related governmental inquir-
ies.0 2 Bear in mind that the punitive damages portion of jury awards
are often much higher than the compensatory damages award. Con-
sequently, if insurance companies are required to pay punitive dam-
100. Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London and
Certain London Market Companies at 7-9, Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
143 Wash. 2d 1026, 22 P.3d 802 (2001) (No. 70519-4). For example,
It is important to recognize that this coverage case presents itself in Washington for
no other reason than Fluke beat Hartford to the courthouse. Fluke initiated this de-
claratory judgment action in Washington before the underlying California malicious
prosecution trial started. Hartford commenced a declaratory judgment action in Cali-
fornia while the Washington court was considering whether Talon Industries and
Corby were necessary parties to the Washington action and whether it had jurisdic-
tion over them. It was not until the Washington Superior Court ruled that it had ju-
risdiction over Talon Industries and Corby that the California court dismissed the de-
claratory judgment action.
Id.
101. Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 246, 7 P.3d at 830.
102. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Amicus Curiae Certain Under-
writers at Lloyd's, London and Certain London Market Companies at 4-5 (citing BLATT,
HAMMESFAHR & NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5.2 (1991)), Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 143 Wash. 2d 1026,
22 P.3d 802 (2001) (No. 70519-4).
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ages awards, they will pass these costs on to the policy-buying public
through higher premiums."' Thus, by forcing innocent policyholders
to contribute more to the insurance pool through higher premiums,
instead of punishing the wrongdoer, society punishes itself for the
wrongdoer's egregious behavior." 4 The Fluke court failed to appreci-
ate or consider the burden imposed on the premium-paying public if
the public is forced to "subsidize" others' intentional misconduct.
One could argue that the insurance industry and innocent poli-
cyholders will not subsidize the increased premiums but rather that
these costs will fall on the intentional tortfeasors who must pay in-
creased premiums or suffer a lack of or reduction in future coverage.
However, this argument fails to recognize that the intentional tortfea-
sor will still be permitted to reap the benefit of his or her coverage, al-
lowing a sort of "freebie." In other words, Washington insureds will
be entitled to one intentional tort against their insurance policy, with
the possibility of suffering loss of coverage later. The problem is that
the wrong has still occurred, and unfortunately, the pool must subsi-
dize a financial loss that reduces policyholders' surplus. When poli-
cyholders' surplus is reduced, additional premiums must be collected
from all policyholders to replenish the pool. In a case such as Fluke's
where the punitive damages amount to four million dollars, it is
unlikely that the insurer can or will recoup these funds from the one
policyholder that perpetrated the loss. The funds must come from the
entire policy-buying public in the form of higher premiums.
Furthermore, if the intentional wrongdoer loses its insurance
coverage, all future premiums from innocent insureds must subsidize
the shortfall because the insurance company will no longer collect a
premium from the intentional wrongdoer. The real losers under this
sort of regime are the insurance companies and their blameless policy-
holders. Washington courts should prohibit such a regime.
G. Distinguishing between Punitive Damages Awarded for Unintentional
and Intentional Conduct
As noted earlier in Part II, a debate about the merits of punitive
damages coverage would be incomplete without distinguishing be-
tween intentional and unintentional conduct. In Fluke, the Court of
Appeals failed to make this distinction. Instead, the court broadly
stated that punitive damages are insurable regardless of the nature of
the underlying conduct that gave rise to the assessment of punitive
103. N.W. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-42 (5th Cir. 1962).
104. Id.
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damages."' However, several of the states that have addressed the in-
surability of punitive damages clearly distinguish between punitive
damages awarded for unintentional conduct and those awarded for in-
tentional misconduct.1 6 A well-reasoned holding would have recog-
nized that punitive damages assessed for intentional misconduct sig-
nify that the actor has acted with malice and that one who acts with
malice should not be allowed to pass the costs of their misconduct on
to the insurer and the policy-buying public in general. On the other
hand, if a wrongdoer has acted with negligence or gross negligence,
with no actual intent to do harm, the court could allow punitive dam-
ages arising out of such conduct to be insured, subject to contrary
statements by the Legislature.
To illustrate the difference between intentional and unintentional
conduct with regard to public policy, it is helpful to review three ex-
amples of negligence illustrated in an Oregon Supreme Court case that
do not rise to the level of intentional misconduct yet could neverthe-
less expose a tortfeasor to punitive damages. First, a physician whose
treatment of a patient is grossly negligent may be held liable for puni-
tive damages. 7 Second, a creditor who has occasion to repossess per-
sonal property pledged as security for an unpaid debt may be subject
to liability for punitive damages if a jury decides that the creditor
acted improperly and in disregard of plaintiffs rights, even though the
defendant exercised what he believed to be a legal right." 8 Third, the
operator of a retail store who unwittingly sells goods in a package
bearing representation that he should know to be false or misleading, or
who blindly engages in a practice that he should know to be unfair or
deceptive, contrary to the provisions of the Oregon Unlawful Trade
Practices Act, may also be subject to an uninsurable liability for puni-
tive damages.'
0 9
Rejecting the defendant's argument that insuring punitive dam-
ages was against Oregon's public policy in all cases, the Oregon Su-
preme Court stated,
[E]ven though the risks involved in each of these examples were
of such a nature as to be encountered in the operation of such
business or professions, and the conduct involved did not in-
volve 'intentionally inflicted injury,' any contract with an insur-ance company to provide protection against the risk of punitive
105. See Fluke, 102 Wash. App. at 247-48, 7 P.3d at 830.
106. See generally Masters, supra note 15, at 283; Rosenhouse, supra note 26, at 11.
107. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Or. 1977).
108. Id.
109. Id.
Seattle University Law Review
damages as the result of such conduct would become invalid as a
matter of 'public policy,' .... "'
In making the distinction between intentionally inflicted injury
and injury that is the result of gross negligence or recklessness, the
Oregon Supreme Court advanced sound public policy by ensuring
that those who inadvertently commit harms resulting in punitive dam-
ages may insure against that harm."' However, Washington courts
failed to appreciate the distinction set forth above by wrongly allowing
these protections to be extended to policyholders who commit inten-
tional harm."'
The Washington courts should have adopted the Oregon Su-
preme Court's view and limited the insurability of punitive damages
to situations not caused by intentional misconduct. Such a decision
would have evolved Washington's public policy of discouraging acts
or contracts that injure the public health, the public morals, or the
public confidence in the purity of the administration of the law,1
3
while protecting those who, without specific intent, cause injury to
others.
As noted, a number of reasons describe why the Washington
Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the insuring of punitive dam-
ages is not against Washington's public policy. Punitive damages
coverage does not automatically exist merely because there are no stat-
utes prohibiting it. Insurability of punitive damages is not implied by
the prohibition of such damages. Insurance for intentional wrongdo-
ing promotes bad behavior. There is no evidence that Fluke and
Hartford specifically negotiated punitive damages coverage. Punish-
ment and deterrence are negated by insurance for punitive damages.
Insuring intentional wrongdoers allows them to pass their costs to the
public. Finally, courts should distinguish between unintentional and
intentional wrongdoing. Had the Court of Appeals considered these
arguments, it may have come to a different conclusion in its holding
on the insurability of punitive damages.
110. Id. at 1018-19 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 1021 (holding that insurance protection should be available to a professional
person or wage earner or to a housewife or retired person, who might well be ruined financially
by a judgment for punitive damages as the result of conduct of no more flagrancy than an act of
gross negligence,' a momentary 'reckless' act, or conduct 'contrary to societal interests.').
112. Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 102 Wash. App. 237, 7 P.3d 825
(2000).
113. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wash. 2d 477, 483, 687 P.2d 1139, 1143
(1984).
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V. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
On November 21, 2001, the Washington Supreme Court af-
firmed the Court of Appeals on all issues. 114 In its opinion, the court
devoted a mere paragraph to the topic of whether insuring punitive
damages was against public policy in Washington."' Finding that
"this state has articulated no such public policy [against insuring puni-
tive damages], either by statute or judicial decision[,]" ' 6 the court
simply "[d]ecline[d] to conclude that insuring oneself against a disfa-
vored penalty runs counter to public policy.""' 7 Therefore, as it cur-
rently stands, punitive damages are insurable in Washington whether
they arise from intentional misconduct or not.
The problem with the Washington Supreme Court's opinion is
that its brevity causes one to question whether the court adequately
considered the insurability of punitive damages issue. Instead of pro-
viding a detailed explanation of why it arrived at this conclusion, the
court seemingly based its whole decision on the fact that neither the
Washington Legislature nor the Washington courts have articulated
any public policy theories against insuring punitive damages." 8 Or,
perhaps the Washington Supreme Court implicitly accepted the Court
of Appeals's rationale, declining to take time to synopsize the actual
reasons for its decision.
Either way, the court's apparent disregard for the importance of
the issue is disappointing. The court, unfortunately, did not consider
whether there should be a difference between insuring punitive dam-
ages assessed for intentional misconduct as opposed to insuring puni-
tive damages assessed for unintentional conduct (e.g., gross negligence
and recklessness). Interestingly, the court implied in dictum that a
court could make a public policy decision when it said, "this state has
articulated no such public policy ... by ... judicial decision.'"" ' Being
the highest court in this state, it could have taken the position that
intentional wrongdoers should not benefit from their misconduct, and
it could (and should) have reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent
that insuring punitive damages was permitted without limitation.
114. Fluke Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 145 Wash. 2d 137, 141, 34 P.3d
809, 811 (2001).




119. Id. (emphasis added).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Washington Court of
Appeals, and ultimately the Washington Supreme Court, incorrectly
held that there is no public policy objection to insuring punitive dam-
ages in Washington. First, the lack of a statute or judicial decision
prohibiting the insurance of punitive damages does not imply that
Washington therefore allows coverage for punitive damages without
considering public policy. Second, while Washington courts disfavor
the awarding of punitive damages in most instances, it does not follow
that public policy therefore favors insurance for punitive damages.
Third, allowing insureds to insure their own misconduct may implic-
itly give them permission to commit such misconduct. Fourth, it is
doubtful that Fluke and Hartford expressly agreed that punitive dam-
ages would be covered by Fluke's policies or that Hartford charged a
premium for it.
Fifth, punitive damages are awarded for two reasons: punish-
ment and deterrence. Allowing insureds to protect themselves against
paying punitive damages awards frustrates states' desires to both pun-
ish insureds that have committed serious wrongs and deter others
from committing the same wrongs. Sixth, allowing policyholders to
pass the cost of their wrongdoing on to insurance companies and their
insureds serves no purpose other than to punish the public for the
misconduct of others. Finally, both courts failed to distinguish be-
tween insuring against unintentional versus intentional wrongdoing.
In closing, if the Washington Supreme Court strongly felt that
punitive damages should be covered to some extent, it should have
adopted approaches similar to many other states surveyed in this Note
and made a distinction between unintentional conduct and intentional
misconduct. The Washington Supreme Court therefore should have
reversed the Court of Appeals and prohibited insuring punitive dam-
ages altogether, or alternatively, it should have permitted insuring pu-
nitive damages only to the extent that they arise out of unintentional
conduct. The Washington Legislature should accordingly pick up the
baton dropped by the Washington Supreme Court and enact legisla-
tion that exempts punitive damages for intentional misconduct from
insurability.
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Appendix
STATE SURVEY OF THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS A
MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY
























































West Virginia X X
Wisconsin X
Wyoming X
TOTALS 27 8 18 10 6
If coverage is expressly provided in policy.
If assessed against municipalities pursuant to federal statute.
* When based on ordinary negligence.
Only insurable if assessed for negligence.
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